When the Restatement Is Not a Restatement: The Curious Case of the  Flagrant Trespasser by Logan, David A.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 37 | Issue 3 Article 11
2011
When the Restatement Is Not a Restatement: The
Curious Case of the "Flagrant Trespasser"
David A. Logan
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Logan, David A. (2011) "When the Restatement Is Not a Restatement: The Curious Case of the "Flagrant Trespasser"," William





WHEN THE RESTATEMENT IS NOT A RESTATEMENT: 
THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE “FLAGRANT 
TRESPASSER” 
David A. Logan† 
 
 I. THE ALI AND LAW REFORM ................................................. 1449 
A. When Giants Walked the Earth: The ALI and the First 
and Second Restatements of Torts ..................................... 1449 
B.  The First and Second Torts Restatements ......................... 1454 
C.  The Third Restatement ................................................... 1459 
 II. HOW WE GOT HERE: THE PREMISES MESS .......................... 1463 
 III. THE ALI LABORATORY CREATES THE “FLAGRANT 
TRESPASSER” ........................................................................ 1467 
 IV. THE THIRD RESTATEMENT AND THE ROAD NEVER BEFORE 
TAKEN .................................................................................. 1473 
A. The Inconsistency Critique ............................................... 1473 
B.  The Terminology Critique ............................................... 1474 
C.  The Lawmaking Critique ................................................ 1475 
D.  The Legitimacy Critique .................................................. 1480 
 V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 1483 
 
Restatement: /r’I st’e•tm•nt: An iteration that repeats a prior 
statement, usually in a slightly different form.  Synonym: reiteration1 
 
The American Law Institute (ALI), in existence since 1923, has 
a distinguished reputation for its law reform projects, typically 
“restatements” of areas of domestic common law.2  The most 
 
       †   David A. Logan, Dean and Professor of Law, Roger Williams University.  
Dean Logan is an adviser for the Third Restatement.  He would like to thank 
David DiSegna for his excellent research assistance and Tracy Sartrys for her 
continuing professional support.  Thanks also to Mike Green and Wayne Logan 
for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. ROGET’S II THE NEW THESAURUS 832–33 (Kaethe Ellis et al. eds., 3d ed. 
1995). 
 2. In recent years, the ALI has branched out to projects concerned with 
international law (e.g., Transnational Insolvency) and domestic topics typically 
1
Logan: When the Restatement Is Not a Restatement: The Curious Case of th
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
2011] WHEN THE RESTATEMENT IS NOT A RESTATEMENT 1449 
successful of these projects involves the law of torts.  There were 
more than 160,000 judicial citations to restatements by 2004, with 
the largest single number, by a considerable margin, involving 
torts.3  Additionally, positions promulgated by the ALI, though not 
binding on any court, often loom large in doctrinal debates.4 
This essay will first discuss the ALI and the role it has played in 
law reform, especially when it navigates the tension between simply 
adopting a well-developed majority position and the desire to “get 
it right” (by selecting a distinctly minority position).  I will then 
turn to one of the rare occasions in which the ALI in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harm (2010) (Third Restatement) opted for a position that is not 
even a minority rule, but rather is a novel formulation—the 
“flagrant trespasser” in premises liability cases—that is, when the 
restatement does not “restate” the law.  I will conclude with some 
reflections on the wisdom of such a bold step. 
I. THE ALI AND LAW REFORM 
A. When Giants Walked the Earth: The ALI and the First and Second 
Restatements of Torts 
In the early decades of the twentieth century, a project to 
“restate the law” was attractive to both the formalists then reigning 
in the bench and bar, as well as the legal realists, who were gaining 
influence, especially in law schools.5  To the old guard, 
 
controlled by statutes (e.g., Professional Responsibility).  Projects, Overview, 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.main 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2011). 
 3. During this time there were more than 67,000 citations to the torts 
restatements, with the contracts restatements a distant second with slightly less than 
29,000 citations.  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PUBLISHED CASE CITATIONS TO 
RESTATEMENTS OF THE LAW AS OF MARCH 1, 2004 (2004), available at http://www.ali.org
/_news/annualreports/2004/AM04_07-RestatementCitations04.pdf. 
 4. See Gregory C. Keating, Is Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress a 
Freestanding Tort?, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1134–35 (2009) (recognizing the 
“Restatement impulse to elicit taxonomical order” but arguing that the 
Restatement does not accurately reflect the order immanent in the law); 
Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook: Classroom as Biography and Intellectual 
History, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 579 (2010) (describing the broad influence of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)). 
 5. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 77–78 (1977); see also 
John P. Frank, The American Law Institute, 1923–1998, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 615, 617 
(1998) (noting that the thirty-five member committee, including Benjamin 
Cardozo, Learned Hand, and Roscoe Pound, reported that uncertainty and 
2
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traditionalists who considered the common law “a closed system 
that yielded answers to all issues that arise,”6 this presented an 
opportunity to bolster their view of law as science and to lock in 
contemporary principles and practices, an aspect of a broader 
effort to rebuff the mongrelization of the profession via the 
proliferation of night law schools that primarily served immigrant 
strivers.7  The President of the Association of American Law 
Schools (AALS) was blunt: “As long as our doors were entered 
chiefly by immigrants of cognate blood, the common law as it was 
studied by Story and Langdell might safely be left to develop and 
adapt itself to each changed condition.  But within the last twenty 
years a horde of alien races from Eastern Europe and from Asia has 
been pouring in on us . . . .”8 
Xenophobia and a deep-seated fear of change were not, 
however, the only motivations of the traditionalists.  Formalists also, 
more palatably, saw a need for “definite standards by which the 
activities of business, industry and commerce are conducted.”9 
The countervailing jurisprudence of legal realism can be 
traced, in part, to the provocative ideas of Roscoe Pound who, as 
dean at the University of Nebraska College of Law, and later a 
faculty member and dean at Harvard Law School, focused on the 
imprecise nature of the law.10  Pound argued for legal principles 
 
complexity caused by badly written statutes and unnecessary administrative 
provisions required a “Restatement of the Law”). 
 6. Frank, supra note 5, at 624 (quoting ALI Director Herbert Wechsler). 
 7. The “conventional wisdom [was] that the ALI was created by a band of 
legal formalists working hand in hand with the legal moguls of New York and 
Philadelphia corporate finance to save the common law from statutory 
liberalization and other un-American pollutants.”  N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and 
Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute, in THE AMERICAN 
LAW INSTITUTE: SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY, 1923–1998, 49, 52 (1998); see also G. 
Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 
15 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 3 (1997) (describing the “conservatives,” who swore fealty 
to nineteenth-century conceptions of law was a branch of science, “logically self-
contained and self-referential, like geometry, or taxonomic, like the natural 
sciences”). 
 8. Hull, supra note 7, at 60–61.  Another AALS leader observed:  
[I]f you examine the class rolls of the night schools in our great cities, 
you will encounter a very large proportion of foreign names. . . . The 
result is a host of shrewd young men, imperfectly educated, crammed so 
they can pass bar examinations . . . but viewing the Code of Ethics with 
uncomprehending eyes. 
Id. at 61. 
 9. Frank, supra note 5, at 621 (quoting ALI President George W. 
Wickersham). 
 10. See Larry A. DiMatteo & Samuel Flaks, Beyond Rules, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 297, 
3
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based on the world as it was, rather than law plucked from the 
ether.11  These critics accepted, and in some cases embraced, the 
notion that legal rules were inherently impermanent, and that 
there needed to be adjustments based upon “evolving empirical 
data.”12 
Despite the tug of the two schools of jurisprudence, on 
balance, the founders of the ALI were primarily “reformist 
progressive-pragmatists who viewed the law as the means to 
achieving social ends, believers in the power of the legal profession 
to bring about positive change.”13 
Many legal luminaries gathered in 1923 to consider creating 
what was to become the American Law Institute.  In attendance 
were three justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, five 
federal court of appeals judges, twenty-eight representatives from 
state supreme courts, representatives from the American Bar 
Association and the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform Laws, plus stars from legal education, including twenty-
three law school deans.14  They met to consider the report of a com-
mittee of thirty-five, which included Associate Justice Harlan F. 
Stone, Judges Benjamin Cardozo and Learned Hand, top appellate 
advocate John W. Davis, Dean Roscoe Pound, and Professor John 
Wigmore.15 
 
326 (2010) (exploring the two lines of legal thought comprising the legal realist 
movement). 
 11. See Hull, supra note 7, at 53. 
 12. White, supra note 7, at 3.  White argues that the view that the ALI pitted 
two different schools of jurisprudence is overstated and that the progressives 
differed from conservatives in points of emphasis, but not with the basic idea that 
“restating the law” would yield more predictable judicial decisions.  Id. at 9–10.  It 
remained for the proponents of critical legal studies to take the perspective that 
law is personal and indeterminate to its logical conclusion.  See Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, Factless Jurisprudence, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 615, 617 n.9 (2003) 
(citing John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal 
Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84, 89 
(1995)). 
 13. Hull, supra note 7, at 86.  But see GILMORE, supra note 5, at 73 (“No doubt 
most of the people who were caught up in the Restatement project shared the 
Institute’s official position” that there were fundamental principles of the 
common law, which did not change.). 
 14. The New York Times described the meeting as “probably the most 
distinguished gathering of the legal profession in the history of this country.”  
Hull, supra note 7, at 89. 
 15. See JOHN P. FRANK, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: SEVENTY-FIFTH 
ANNIVERSARY, 1923–98, 9 (1998).  Support for the ALI was not, however, uniform—
Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. quoted Justice Louis Brandeis as 
quipping, “Why, I am restating the law every day.”  THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 
4
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The report concluded that there was a pressing need for an 
institute that would create a “Restatement of the Law” to deal with 
the deplorable state of the common law.16  First, there was the 
“great volume of the annual increase to the already overwhelming 
mass of reported cases,” which “cannot be directly checked by any 
action which may be taken by the profession.”17  This, in turn, 
resulted in a “‘lack of agreement among [the members of the legal 
profession on] the fundamental principles of the common law’ and 
the ‘lack of precision in the use of legal terms.’”18  “The committee 
concluded that these ‘two causes of uncertainty and complexity are 
precisely those over which the legal profession has the greatest 
control.’”19  The report concluded:  
We speak of the work which the organization should 
undertake as a restatement; its object should not only be 
to help make certain much that is now uncertain and to 
simplify unnecessary complexities, but also to promote 
those changes which will tend better to adapt the laws to 
the needs of life.  The character of the restatement which 
we have in mind can be best described by saying that it 
should be at once analytical, critical and constructive.20 
Despite these grounds for agreement, the participants 
recognized from the outset the inherent tension at the core of their 
mission: should the goal be to simply count citations (“the law as it 
is”) or to articulate what the law should be.  As the report observed, 
“the law is not always well adapted to promote what the 
preponderating thought of the community regards as the needs of 
life.”21  However, the changes should be restricted to those that are 
“generally accepted as desirable.”22  
 
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 50TH ANNIVERSARY 276 (2d ed. 1973) (quoting a 
letter written by Justice Holmes). 
 16. Frank, supra note 5, at 617 (quoting the ALI’s first committee report in 
1923); see infra note 20, at 173–223. 
 17. Frank, supra note 5, at 617 (quoting the ALI’s first committee report in 
1923); see infra note 20, at 187. 
 18. Frank, supra note 5, at 617 (quoting the ALI’s first committee report in 
1923); see infra note 20, at 186. 
 19. Frank, supra note 5, at 617 (quoting the ALI’s first committee report in 
1923); see infra note 20, at 188. 
 20. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT 
ORGANIZATION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW PROPOSING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
AN AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, THE AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY 1923–1998, 190 (1998).  
 21. Id. at 192. 
 22. Id.; Frank, supra note 5, at 618 (quoting the institute’s report). 
5
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The group approved the establishment of the ALI and, after 
securing funding from the Carnegie Foundation, set about to study 
core topics that became the first restatements in contracts, agency, 
conflicts, and torts.23  These reports, in the distinctive black 
letter/comment format, were drafted in the first instance by a 
“reporter,” who recruited a group of experts to serve as “advisers,” 
who helped the reporter prepare a subject-specific document that 
would be considered by a “council,” and finally approved by the full 
membership of the ALI24  
The ALI was organized in a way that enhanced its influence in 
the coming decades.  By giving the critical role of reporter to 
academic lawyers, the ALI made it likely that its proposals would be 
well-grounded in the current law and mindful of doctrinal critiques 
and suggestions for reform.  The flip-side risk of turning out 
proposals that were excessively academic was checked by the 
presence in the membership, and on the council, of significant 
numbers of practicing lawyers and judges.  Quality control also was 
enhanced by the requirement that all voters—whether in the rank-
and-file membership, the drafting committee of the advisers, or the 
council—were to be elected on a meritocratic basis.  Finally, the 
requirement that any final draft had to be approved by both the 
council and the entire membership minimized the risk that the 




 23. Frank, supra note 5, at 619. 
 24. For a thorough survey of the restatement process, see Kristen David 
Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements and the Common Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 205 
(2007). 
 25. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, 303–
04 (1999); see also id. at 309 (“The Institute’s unusual balance of practical lawyerly 
judgment, legislative-type consensus-generating machinery, and scholarly expertise 
equips it to provide leadership in [law reform].”); Herbert Wechsler, Foreward, THE 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 50TH ANNIVERSARY, vii–viii (2d ed. 1973) (noting that one 
of the greatest strengths of the ALI is the “triple challenge” of consecutive review 
of the reporter’s draft by the project’s advisers, the council, and the membership 
of the ALI).  There is also a less flattering motive for the ALI’s organization: status.  
White, supra note 7, at 3 (“The composition of the Institute, the selection process 
for its members, the self-conscious links forged in that process between elite law 
faculties, elite practitioners, and judges . . . were efforts to clarify and reinforce 
status criteria and status distinctions within the legal profession.”). 
6
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B. The First and Second Torts Restatements 
The reporter for the Restatement (First) of Torts (1934) (First 
Restatement) was Francis Bohlen from the University of 
Pennsylvania, “the outstanding and nationally known expert in 
[the] field.”26  He recruited an all-star team of advisers that 
included leading federal judges (Learned Hand), state judges 
(Connecticut Chief Justice George Wheeler), and top academics 
from Yale Law School (Leon Green and Edward Thurston) and 
University of Chicago Law School (Dean James Hall), with perhaps 
the greatest common law judge, New York’s Benjamin Cardozo, 
attending a number of meetings in an unofficial capacity.27 
From the outset, all members of the ALI agreed that the 
common law needed to be “tidied up,”28 but there was 
disagreement as to whether the restatements should be descriptive 
or prescriptive.  As a long-time member of the ALI Council, Shirley 
Abrahamson, chief justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 
observed: There is always the struggle between the law “that is” and 
the law as it “ought to be.”29 
 
 
 26. William Draper Lewis, Francis Hermann Bohlen, 91 U. PA. L. REV. & AM. L. 
REG. 377, 381 (1943). 
 27. An academic kerfuffle arose when the leading torts scholar of the mid-
century era, William L. Prosser, attacked Cardozo’s behavior in conjunction with 
the first restatement.  Prosser alleged that Cardozo attended a meeting of the 
advisers (he was not technically an adviser, but his standing as a top thinker about 
torts issues explained his presence) while knowing that he would soon be 
considering the appeal of a case involving a bizarre chain of events that led to a 
woman’s injury while she stood on the defendant’s railroad platform.  William L. 
Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1953).  Prosser asserted that Cardozo 
attended the meeting but did not participate in the discussion or vote on the 
“hypothetical”.  Id. at 4.  In Prosser’s account, Cardozo returned to Albany and 
soon ruled in the railroad’s favor by adopting the majority view of the advisers.  Id. 
at 5.  The ALI adopted the view expressed by Cardozo in Palsgraf, and even used 
the facts of Palsgraf for one of its illustrations.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 
281 cmt. g, illus. 3 (1934).  To Prosser, “[i]t is not likely that any other case in all 
history ever elevated itself by its own bootstraps in so remarkable a manner.”  
Prosser, supra note 27, at 8.  More recent scholarship acknowledges that Cardozo 
heard ALI discussions about the border between duty and proximate cause raised 
by Palsgraf but disputes whether Cardozo actually attended a meeting that 
discussed the facts of Palsgraf before he heard the appeal.  ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, 
CARDOZO, 286–95 (1998). 
 28. Posner, supra note 25, at 304 (arguing that the ALI is less well-adapted 
today than it was in the 1920s because doctrinal law has been tidied up by now). 
 29. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and the 
American Law Institute the Fairchild Lecture, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1, 17 (1995). 
7
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By general consensus, the first restatements, which consisted of 
nineteen volumes,30 broke little new ground, pursuing what one 
scholar termed the “mild reform” strategy suggested in the ALI’s 
founding document: when the laws in the states differ in ways “not 
due to differences in economic and social conditions . . . the 
restatement should make clear what is believed to be the proper 
rule of law.”31 
Work on a second series of restatements began at the end of 
World War II, and the tension between restating and reforming the 
law was raised explicitly by Judge Learned Hand.32  A committee he 
headed concluded that the organization should identify which 
provisions were “‘founded on historical facts,’ which were 
‘unjustified by any principles of justice, but are unimportant or 
harmless and may be left as they are because of the desirably of 
certainty,’ and ‘what rules are insupportable in principle and evil in 
action.’”33  Henry Hart and Albert Sacks criticized the preference 
for conservatism: “[T]he Institute limited itself to the role only of a 
follower in the statement of the law and of a follower, moreover, 
willing to join the parade only after it was well under way.”34  This 
preference for de juris condendum—the law as it should be—would 
prove to be an even stronger force for the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts (1965) (Second Restatement).35   
 
 30. Herbert Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of Policy in the 
Restatement Work of the American Law Institute, 13 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 185, 185–86 
(1968) (on the topics of contracts, agency, conflict of laws, trusts, restitution, torts, 
security, judgments, and property). 
 31. Patrick J. Kelley, The First Restatement of Torts: Reform by Descriptive Theory, 32 
S. ILL. U. L.J. 93, 106 (2007).  Kelley believes that the only significant reform came 
via the adoption of reporter Bohlen’s innovative positions on liability for children 
and the insane.  Id. at 107; see also Frank, supra note 5, at 624 (the only case where 
the ALI adopted a distinctly minority principle was section 90 of the contracts 
restatement, which involved promissory estoppel); Benjamin Kaplan, Encounters 
with O.W. Holmes, Jr., 96 HARV. L. REV. 1828, 1835 (1983) (the first restatements of 
contracts and torts were “relatively conservative works”); Warren A. Seavey, The 
Restatement, Second, and Stare Decisis, 48 A.B.A. J. 317, 318 (1962) (“[T]he 
statements were usually in agreement with the rules in a very large percentage of 
the states, a survey showing something like ninety per cent [sic] agreement with 
decided cases on contested points . . . .”). 
 32. See generally Frank, supra note 5, at 622–23 (“[C]onclud[ing] that the first 
Restatement had been overly static”). 
 33. Frank, supra note 5, at 623. 
 34. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW 740 (William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
 35. A willingness to adopt minority positions, and thus become more 
prescriptive, was consistent with the gradual change in outlook of the ALI 
8
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The ALI once again assembled a supremely talented team for 
the Second Restatement project: Berkeley Dean William Prosser—
whose treatise had already become a fixture for practitioners and 
academics36—was named reporter, and he was assisted by a roster of 
advisers that included academic luminaries John Wade (Vanderbilt 
University Law School), Fleming James, Jr. (Yale Law School), 
Warren Seavey and Robert Keeton (Harvard Law School), Page 
Keeton (University of Texas School of Law), Clarence Morris 
(University of Pennsylvania School of Law), and Roger Traynor, 
chief justice of the California Supreme Court.37  The introduction 
to the publications acknowledged “there has been enormous 
change in torts” since the First Restatement; indeed, “the scope of 
change wrought by the courts may . . . have transcended that in any 
other field.”38  The project was massive: it involved twenty-two 
preliminary drafts, forty-one council drafts, and twenty-three 
tentative drafts produced over a period of twenty-two years.39 
The most significant, and controversial, change wrought by 
Dean Prosser et al. was a new section covering injuries caused by 
defective products.40  Courts had been gradually extending the 
scope of contract (warranty) law (which required no proof of fault) 
to an array of consumer injuries from food products, and, in a few 
scattered cases, to injuries caused by products “intended for bodily 
use” (such as cosmetics).  However, there was only scholarly 
authority for a global theory of strict liability for products injuries 
 
directors over the years.  See Abrahamson, supra note 29 at 19–21. 
 36. Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook: Classroom as Biography and 
Intellectual History, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 579 (2010). 
 37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, iii–iv (1965).  Justice Traynor was 
perhaps the best-known state court judge of his era.  Stewart Macaulay, Justice 
Traynor and the Law of Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REV. 812, 812 (1961) (“In his twenty 
years on the Supreme Court of California Justice Roger J. Traynor has become one 
of the country’s best known state judges.”). 
 38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Introduction, at ix (1965). 
 39. Michael Greenwald, American Law Institute, 79 LAW LIBR. J. 297, 302 
(1987). 
 40. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 265 (2d ed. 2008).  The Second 
Restatement also made significant changes to the narrow pocket of cases that were 
deemed appropriate for strict liability, i.e., those activities deemed 
“ultrahazardous.”  This section was satisfied when the activity was both especially 
dangerous and not a “matter of common usage.”  Further, the Second 
Restatement changed terminology to “abnormally dangerous activities,” and 
adopted a multi-factor approach, of which common usage was only a factor (as is 
whether the locale was appropriate for the activity).  This approach was harshly 
criticized, inter alia, as a “poorly disguised negligence regime.”  DAN B. DOBBS, THE 
LAW OF TORTS 953 (2000). 
9
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generally41 until the California Supreme Court handed down 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,42 in 1963.  Building on this 
single decision, the Second Restatement announced a new doctrine 
of strict products liability in tort.43   
At the same time, Dean Prosser was reworking the sections 
from the First Restatement that covered injuries from products.  In 
rapid succession he proposed drafts that moved from a beachhead 
of strict liability in tort for injuries caused by food (1958), 
expanding to “products intended for intimate bodily use, including 
products intended for external application or contact” (1962)44 
and, finally, to all products (1964).45  Despite sharp criticism of the 
new provision,46 the resulting section 402A was adopted by the ALI 
in 1964.47 
Section 402A was built on scant doctrinal foundation, as Dean 
Prosser could point to virtually no case authority and relatively little 
scholarship to tease out the application of the core concept of strict 
liability in tort to the variety of contexts in which products could 
harm consumers, let alone bystanders.  In essence, the ALI, quite 
uncharacteristically, boldly painted on what amounted to a blank 
canvas.  As one early critic put it, the ALI was guilty of “ignoring the 
traditional role of the Institute: to restate only rules of law 
embraced by a majority of the courts.”48  Many courts fell in line 
 
 41. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). 
 42. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).  There were cases that imposed strict liability via 
application of the implied warranty of merchantability, but such cases, as a 
technical matter, were not considered to reflect tort law and, more significantly, 
provided defendants with an array of defenses (like the ability to disclaim a 
warranty or requiring notice before filing suit) that were anti-consumer and not 
applicable to claims sounding in tort.  See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument 
Corp., 191 N.E.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. 1963) (applauding Greenman for recognizing “‘strict 
tort liability’ (surely a more accurate phrase)” rather than breach of warranty). 
 43. OWEN, supra note 40, at 257. 
 44. OWEN, supra note 40, at 265 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
402A (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1961)). 
 45. OWEN, supra note 40, at 265.  
 46. The Defense Research Institute widely circulated a brief arguing that the 
ALI should return to its traditional policy of “restating established law as it is.”  
Fred B. Helms, The Restatements: Existing Law or Prophecy, 56 A.B.A. J. 152, 154 
(1970); see also Jay M. Smyser, Products Liability and the American Law Institute: A 
Petition for Rehearing, 42 U. DETROIT L.J. 343 (1965) (arguing section 402A was 
unjustified in either decisional law or sound public policy). 
 47. OWEN, supra note 40, at 281; see Wechsler, supra note 31, at 187–92 
(detailing the deliberations by the ALI Council that led to the approval of section 
402A). 
 48. Herbert W. Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform 
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soon thereafter,49 besting Dean Prosser’s prediction that it would 
take at least five decades for the new principle to become 
dominant.50  The remarkable speed with which section 402A was 
adopted by courts presented its own problems.  While consistent 
with the explosion of progressive reforms across common law, 
legislative, and constitutional law,51 the result was that judges who 
considered product liability claims could not evaluate the wisdom 
of 402A against the backdrop of the careful accretion of precedent 
characteristic of the common law.52 
Over time, courts and scholars came to recognize that there 
was a range of possible product claims, and they increasingly 
questioned whether a strict liability regime made sense in all 
contexts.53  This critique was especially powerful when challenging 
 
Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713, 715 (1970).  Professor Titus also expressed 
dismay that a major change in the law came via the restatement, rather than 
through legislative changes to state versions of the Uniform Commercial Code.  Id. 
at 755 (“If legislative supremacy means anything, it must mean that the courts 
cannot create a new rule of strict tort liability that will displace the products-
liability scheme of the Uniform Commercial Code.”). 
 49. OWEN, supra note 40, at 255 (“[S]trict manufacturer liability for defective 
products swept into the American law of torts during the 1960s”) (citations 
omitted).  
 50. Prosser, supra note 41, at 1120 (“[Strict liability] may very possibly be the 
law of fifty years ahead.”). 
 51. See ROBERT KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE 3 (1969) (describing the 
outpouring of torts opinions across the nation  between 1958 and 1968 as one of 
“candid, openly acknowledged, abrupt change”); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 
201(a), 42 U.S.C. 2000a (2006) (“All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal 
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and 
accommodations of any place of public accommodation . . . without 
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national 
origin.”); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258–59 
(1964) (holding that sections 201–07 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000a–2000a-6 (1964) were constitutional and that a public hotel “has no ‘right’ to 
select its guests as it sees fit, free from governmental regulation”); Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding state sponsored segregation unconstitutional 
and overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). 
 52. Titus, supra note 48, at 716 (“Even so, one might have hoped for some 
judicial restraint so that issues posed by the strict tort rule might have been refined 
and shaped by the facts in actual cases. . . .”); see also Suzanna Sherry, Politics and 
Judgment, 70 MO. L. REV. 973, 982 (2005) (“In both common law and constitutional 
adjudication, incrementalism and adherence to precedent work hand-in-hand to 
ensure that the law will change slowly, through accretion and subtle revision 
rather than through sudden or fundamental shifts in policy.”); Clyde W. Summers, 
American Labor Law Scholarship-Some Comments, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 801, 801 
(2002) (“The law is built on countless court decisions; if it grows at all, it is not so 
much by design, but by accretion.”).  
 53. See, e.g., William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products 
11
Logan: When the Restatement Is Not a Restatement: The Curious Case of th
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
2011] WHEN THE RESTATEMENT IS NOT A RESTATEMENT 1459 
the design of a product, which often involved complex, polycentric 
choices made by technically trained experts, a task for which 402A’s 
“ordinary consumer expectation” test seemed ill-suited.54  
Interestingly, and reflecting the gravitational pull of the 
restatement and the earliest post-Second Restatement judicial 
decisions,55 courts would often hew to the rhetoric of strict liability, 
while actually applying a negligence-like analysis in design defect 
cases.56  Similarly, many courts and commentators came to reject 
true strict liability for products claimed to have informational 
flaws.57  That is, where a plaintiff claimed that the injury occurred 
because of insufficient warnings or instructions.58  The notable 
failure at bold law reform that section 402A represented was a key 
aspect of the intellectual environment that faced the ALI as it 
prepared for a third torts restatement. 
C. The Third Restatement 
As the ALI leadership considered a third restatement of (the 
first topic to be treated with a third project), they addressed two 
important changes: one doctrinal and the other logistical.  First, 
there were areas of tort law that had undergone especially rapid 
change since the Second Restatement.59  As mentioned above, 
there had been significant judicial, scholarly, and legislative 
 
Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L.  REV. 639, 639 (1991) (“[P]roduct cases differ more among 
themselves than they differ from other personal injury cases.”). 
 54.  Id. at 652–55. 
 55. See, e.g., Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976); Thibault 
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. 
Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 
(Or. 1974) (en banc); Turner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979). 
 56. See OWEN, supra note 40, at 255  (“While the courts continued to claim 
that they were applying liability that was ‘strict,’ it became increasingly clear that 
the standards normally applied were truly based on fault.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Steven P. Coley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The 
Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 716–17 (1993); Richard A. 
Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Products Liability Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2193, 2204–06 (1980); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in 
Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. 
REV. 1387, 1416–19 (1983); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A 
Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 374–84 (1988). 
 58. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 59. See Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI 
Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631 (1995) (discussing the evolution of 
products liability law); Aaron D. Twerski, One Size Does Not Fit All: The Third Multi-
Track Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 75 IND. L.J. 667 (2000) (discussing the 
evolution of the concept of “apportionment”). 
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movement away from strict liability for injuries caused by 
products.60 There also had been many changes to what came to be 
termed “apportionment,” caused by the rise of comparative fault 
and the demise of joint and several liability.61  Second, the ALI 
recognized that torts had become so complex that it was 
unreasonable to assign the entire new torts restatement to a single 
reporter, no matter how talented.62  As a result, the Third 
Restatement came to be made up of chunks (or “projects”), now 
termed, Products Liability, Apportionment, Liability for Physical 
and Emotional Harm, and Economic Harm, handled by different 
sets of reporters.63 
The first, and most controversial, project concerned Products 
Liability and the appointment of Professors James Henderson, Jr. 
and Aaron Twerski as co-reporters.64  Henderson and Twerski were 
marked men from the beginning, as their published scholarship 
reflected considerable skepticism about the wisdom of strict liability 
for many, if not most, products-related injuries.65  Henderson was 
candid on this point, observing, “When I was first appointed [co-
reporter with Twerski] the Plaintiff’s Bar had, collectively, what 
might pass for an aneurism,”66 and that “we plead guilty to the 
charge that we did not restate existing case law.  One could hardly 
be expected to restate gibberish.”67 
The jurisprudential philosophy of the reporters was not the 
only flashpoint.  There was also concern about the none-too-subtle 
efforts to hijack the process on the part of ALI members, who in 
 
 60. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. 
 61. Twerski, supra note 59, at 671–72. 
 62. Stephen D. Sugarman, Rethinking Tort Doctrine: Visions of a Restatement 
(Fourth) of Torts, 50 UCLA L. REV. 585, 587 (2002); see also Richard A. Posner, 
Thursday Evening Session, 72 A.L.I. PROC. 321, 323 (1995) (describing how the pool 
of candidates for reporter had moved from the “generally acknowledged leading 
law schools” because of the “democratization of the law school world, which has 
dramatically narrowed the quality differences among the different tiers of law 
schools”).  
 63. See Ellen Pryor, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Coordination and Continuation, 
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1383, 1384 (2009) (describing the various projects, 
including the one covering economic harm, which is now in its early stages). 
 64. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Believing in Products Liability: Reflections on Daubert, 
Doctrinal Evolution, and David Owen’s Products Liability Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
511, 517–18 (2006). 
 65. Id. at 518–19.  
 66. James A. Henderson, Jr., Revising Section 402A: The Limits of Tort as Social 
Insurance, 10 TOURO L. REV. 107, 111 (1993). 
 67. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are 
Different, 111 YALE L.J. 151, 180 (2001). 
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their private practices regularly represented either plaintiffs or 
defendants.68  
Born in controversy and at odds with the original rationales for 
and concepts of strict liability, the core provisions of the products 
liability project were perceived as anti-consumer.69  And, as critics 
predicted, in the ensuing years, key new provisions have been 
rejected by some courts because the rules go “beyond the law,” set 
the bar for recovery too high, and amount to a “regression in the 
law.”70 
Professor Frank Vandall was convinced that the Third 
Restatement’s handling of products represented “radical 
restructuring” of existing products liability theory,71 and that it 
violated the ALI’s mission to “restate the law,”72 while Professor 
Ellen Wertheimer took the ALI to task because the restatement 
“does not in fact restate the law,” but rather, “changes the law, 
invariably in ways unfavorable to plaintiffs and faithless to the 
 
 68. Alex Elson, The Case for an In-Depth Study of the American Law Institute, 23 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 625, 636 (1998) (describing ALI response to “a number of 
gross incidents of special interest lobbying . . . in connection with the . . . product 
liability [restatement]”).  See, e.g., Kristen David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? 
Lessons from the Restatement Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 440–42 (2004); see 
also Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and the 
American Law Institute, 1995 WISC. L. REV. 1, 31 (describing how corporate clients 
were said to have pressured practitioners who were ALI members to oppose 
progressive proposals in violation of the ALI’s “check your client at the door” 
rules); Frank, supra note 5, at 628–31 (describing efforts of “pressure groups” to 
influence ALI projects).  See generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political 
Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 597 (stating that public choice 
theory explains why ALI projects may reflect the “preferences of legislators”).   
 69. Larry S. Stewart, Strict Liability for Defective Product Design: The Quest for a 
Well-Ordered Regime,74 BROOK. L. REV. 1039, 1040 (2009). 
 70. Id.; see also David W. Lannetti, Toward a Revised Definition of “Product” Under 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 845, 851 n.30 
(2000) (describing the conflicting views of leading scholars on the credibility of 
the process and final product); John F. Vargo, The Emperor’s New Clothes: The 
American Law Institute Adorns a “New Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability Design 
Defects—A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493, 501–
02 (1996) (arguing that reporters’ claim that requirement that plaintiffs introduce 
evidence of a “reasonable alternative design” reflected a consensus of authority 
was inaccurate). 
 71. See Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 
2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407, 1407, 
1423–24 (1994). 
 72. Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof Before the Foundation is Prepared: The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 261, 279 (1997). 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss3/11
  
1462 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
original goals of section 402A.”73 
The second project was called “Apportionment,” and it tackled 
an area in which there had been significant change over the 
decades—virtually all states had replaced the mechanical (and 
draconian) affirmative defense of contributory negligence with one 
of several strains of comparative fault.74  Concurrently, there was 
also the erosion of the automatic imposition of joint and several 
liability among multiple tortfeasors.75  While debate was spirited in 
the ALI and in scholarly journals, the Apportionment project was a 
relatively congenial process compared to the war that had erupted 
over the law of products liability.76  
The most wide-ranging of the Third Restatement efforts has 
undergone changes in both nomenclature and scope; the current 
title is “Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm,” but it is still 
often referred to as the “General Principles Project.”77  It has 
generated significant controversy on several fronts, most notably 
involving the adoption of a general rule of duty tied to risk-
creation.78  As one of the reporters, Michael Green, admitted, this 
provision has received “stinging criticism.”79  While most of the 
intellectual combat on whether to impose a general duty of 
reasonable care took place in scholarly journals, the causation 
rules, which were perceived by some to tilt in favor of plaintiffs, 
especially in complex areas like toxic torts, reprised some of the 
ideological battle played out earlier in the ALI debates about 
products liability.80  When the decision was made to extend the 
 
 73. Ellen Wertheimer, The Third Restatement of Torts: An Unreasonably Dangerous 
Doctrine, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1235, 1255 (1994). 
 74. OWEN, supra note 40, at 852. 
 75. See generally John W. Wade, Should Joint and Several Liability of Multiple 
Tortfeasors be Abolished?, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 193 (1986)(discussing the campaign 
for “tort law reform” and its concentrated attack on the rule of joint and several 
liability). 
 76. But see Frank J. Vandall, Constricting Products Liability: Reforms in Theory and 
Procedure, 48 VILL. L. REV. 843, 859 (2003) (“The theme of the Restatement 
(Third): Apportionment is that joint and several liability is flawed, and that any 
approach is better than joint and several liability.”). 
 77. See W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 
671, 679 (2008) (stating that “[t]he portion of the Third Restatement that 
addresses tort duty generally was begun in the latter half of the 1990s, entitled at 
the time ‘General Principles’”). 
 78. See generally Vandall, supra note 76; see also Cardi & Green, supra note 77, 
at 680–81. 
 79. Cardi & Green, supra note 77, at 671. 
 80. The author, David A. Logan, is an ALI adviser for the Third Restatement.  
In his capacity as adviser to the Third Restatement, Mr. Logan attended many 
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General Principles Project to include premises liability, the stage 
was set for an effort to, in at least one circumstance, not restate the 
law, but remake it. 
II. HOW WE GOT HERE: THE PREMISES MESS 
It is a tale oft-told, so it will be only briefly summarized here.  
The American law of premises liability was based upon the feudal 
notion that a man’s worth, both reputational and financial, was tied 
to the ownership of land, which meant that the safety of entrants 
on that land was of scant importance.81  One American court 
described the roots of our common law: 
Traced to its source, the rule exempting a landowner 
from liability to a trespasser injured through the 
condition of the premises is found to have originated in 
an overzealous desire to safeguard the right of ownership 
as it was regarded under a system of landed estates, long 
since abandoned, under which the law ascribed a peculiar 
sanctity to rights therein.  Under the feudal system as it 
existed in western Europe during the Middle Ages, the act 
of breaking a man’s close was an invasion of exaggerated 
importance and gravity.  It was promptly resented.82 
Dean Prosser observed: “He has a privilege to make use of the 
land for his own benefit, and according to his own desires, which is 
an integral part of our whole system of private property.”83 
To implement this preference for safeguarding the rights of 
landowners, the common law established a three-tiered regime that 
tied the level of duty owed to an entrant to the reason he was on 
the land.84  In its earliest form, a “full duty of reasonable care”85  was 
 
meetings in which these provisions were debated. 
 81. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transaltantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 
(1959). 
 82. Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 139 A. 440, 442 (Vt. 1927). 
 83. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 358 (3d ed. 1964). 
 84. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, TORTS 
AND COMPENSATION, 317–30 (6th ed. 2009).  This approach was consistent with the 
general approach of courts to physical injuries, which tied what duties were owed 
to the status/relationship of the injured and the injurer.  See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 40 (Proposed Final 
Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 85. A “full duty of reasonable care” includes both a duty to use reasonable 
care to rectify known dangers and a duty to inspect for the same; other entrants 
are owed a “limited” duty of reasonable care, with no duty to inspect.  5 FOWLER V. 
HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 27.1, 142–46 (3d ed. 2008). 
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owed only to entrants on the premises for a specific business 
purpose, such as performing a contract for the owner, a person 
termed “an invitee.”86   
Other entrants, even those with permission to enter (termed 
“licensees”), were owed a minimal duty—merely to refrain from 
intentionally injuring the entrant, or, in later years, refraining from 
non-intentional, but nevertheless “willful” and “wanton” 
negligence.87  And, if the common law gave little regard for the 
safety of people on the premises with permission but with a non-
business purpose, then it is not surprising that for those on the 
premises without permission (trespassers) property owners only 
owed them the minimal duty to refrain from inflicting injury 
through highly culpable misconduct.88 
By the mid-twentieth century, in both the United States and 
Great Britain, courts had carved out exceptions to what had come 
to be perceived as the unduly harsh results associated with 
application of the three-tiered, or status, approach.89  The first 
route to reform was extending the full duty of reasonable care to 
certain non-business entrants who were on the premises with 
permission.  For example, the courts recognized a new kind of 
invitee, one who lacked a business purpose but was injured while 
on land held open to the public generally.90  Such a “public invitee” 
was owed a full duty of reasonable care even when window 
shopping on private premises or while on public premises, such as 
in a post office or public park.91  
The Second Restatement also recognized the need for change 
to the rules applicable to some trespassers, propounding a cluster 
of ameliorative exceptions to the harsh common law rules: for 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 60, 377–79 (4th 
ed. 1971); see also Keith N. Hylton, Tort Duties of Landowners: A Positive Theory, 44 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1049, 1050 (2009) (explaining the “incentive-based function 
of the classical landowner duties”). 
 88. PROSSER, supra note 83, at 365 (“When they enter where they have no 
right or privilege, the responsibility is theirs, and they must assume the risk of what 
they may encounter, and are expected to look out for themselves.”).  There is also 
an instrumental/economic argument for the minimal duty owed a trespasser. See 
Keith N. Hylton, Tort Duties of Landowners: A Positive Theory, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1049, 1066 (2009) (stating that a rule of limited duty to trespassers is justified 
because the trespasser is often the “cheapest-cost-avoider,” and the law should 
protect the “subjective valuations that landowners attach to property”). 
 89. DOBBS, supra, note 40, at 615–20. 
 90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332(2) cmt. a (1965). 
 91. Id. 
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example, a duty of reasonable care could be owed if the trespasser 
was a child, was confronting a danger known only to the owner, was 
a frequent trespasser on a limited area, or when the trespasser was 
helpless to protect himself from a danger.92 
As has been the case over the generations of the common law, 
these reforms were the result of multiple forces.  Society had 
become increasingly complex and urbanized, making the 
frequency of large, difficult-to-oversee tracts of property far less 
common.  At the same time there was the increased value of safety 
(the recognition that we can all be plaintiffs at some point), 
reflected, for example, in the demise of the “fellow servant rule” 
and the concomitant rise of workers’ compensation.  Similarly, 
policy justifications reflected a mix of normative preferences (for 
example, it seems unfair to allow the owners of public land, 
supported by taxes, to avoid providing entrants a duty of 
reasonable care) and utilitarian principles (the burden to take 
reasonable precautions is less when the duty only attaches to a 
small part of the premises or when the social welfare is maximized 
when the owner can easily save a helpless trespasser from serious 
injury).  
A half-century ago, the myriad rules, based upon what seemed 
to be almost meaninglessly thin distinctions, had become so 
baroque that they seemed ripe for fundamental rethinking.93  The 
vehicle for this change was a decision of the California Supreme 
Court, Rowland v. Christian.94  Consistent with the reformist zeitgeist 
of the times, Rowland attacked the three-tiered duty regime, and its 
myriad exceptions, head-on.95  The facts were simple, and involved 
a pocket of law that California had not reformed: when a social 
guest encounters a latent danger known to the owner or 
discoverable through the use of reasonable care.  In such cases, at 
that time, the law in many jurisdictions often imposed no duty to 
warn.96  This crabbed doctrine violated instrumentalist goals (the 
cost of providing a warning was minimal, and the benefit of 
avoiding the risk of a sliced hand significant), as well as normative 
 
 92. Id. §§ 334–39.  
 93. DOBBS, supra note 40, at 615–16. 
 94. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), superseded by statute, CAL. (PROPERTY) CODE § 847 
(West 2007), as recognized in Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 968 P.2d 65, 71–72 
(Cal. 1998). 
 95. See Cardi & Green, supra note 77, at 672 (discussing how the California 
Supreme Court took a leading role in changing tort law in the 1980s and 1990s). 
 96. See, e.g., HARPER ET AL., supra note 85, at 223–25. 
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goals (it is unfair to make a person on the premises with permission 
face a latent danger known to the owner).  Courts inclined to 
reform could change the law incrementally by imposing a duty to 
warn in such circumstances (but not any duty to inspect), thereby 
changing only one aspect of the centuries-old, tiered regime. 
The California Supreme Court, under the leadership of the 
widely respected Chief Justice William Traynor, chose a bolder 
approach.  Fundamental change was necessary because the 
common law had become so riddled with exceptions that the tiered 
system no longer provided reliable guidance; it was, in the court’s 
language, a “semantic morass.”97  This confusion is “due to the 
attempts to apply just rules in our modern society within the 
ancient terminology.”98  Rather, the negligence system “often 
do[es] not reflect the major factors which should determine 
whether immunity should be conferred upon the possessor of 
land.”99  The court further noted: 
Some of those factors, including the closeness of the 
connection between the injury and the defendant’s 
conduct, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s 
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, and the 
prevalence and availability of insurance, bear little, if any, 
relationship to the classifications of trespasser, licensee 
and invitee and the existing rules conferring immunity.100  
The court chose to apply “ordinary principles of negligence,” 
holding that an owner of property owed all entrants a duty of 
reasonable care, regardless of their purpose for being on the land 
or whether the visit was with permission.101  By imposing a “unitary” 
standard and a duty of reasonable care in all circumstances, 
Rowland had the practical consequence of narrowing the range of 
cases in which a trial judge could dispose of a premises liability 
 
 97. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 566 (“In an effort to do justice in an industrialized 
urban society, with its complex economic and individual relationships, modern 
common-law courts have found it necessary to formulate increasingly subtle verbal 
refinements, to create subclassifications among traditional common-law 
categories, and to delineate fine gradations in the standards of care which the 
landowner owes to each.  Yet even within a single jurisdiction, the classifications 
and subclassifications bred by the common law have produced confusion and 
conflict.  As new distinctions have been spawned, older ones have become 
obscured.”). 
 98. Id. at 567.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 568. 
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claim before trial.  But while doing away with the tiered approach, 
the court provided a Delphic, and potentially significant, 
qualification: while status was no longer “determinative” of whether 
a duty of reasonable care was owed, it may “have some bearing on 
the question of liability.”102   
Despite this last limit on the boldness and scope of the 
decision, Rowland triggered much interest on the part of other 
courts and scholars, with many predictions that the unitary 
approach was destined to replace status-based rules.103  As it turned 
out, there was no flood of fundamental reform to the status-based 
regime over the next forty years: only a few jurisdictions followed 
California and completely eliminated status as the basis for 
differing duties, while a much larger group melded the invitee and 
licensee category, recognizing a duty of reasonable care to 
everyone on land with permission, but continuing to impose a far 
more limited duty when the entrant was a trespasser.104  The 
remaining states, a strong minority, retained all three statuses but 
continued the time-honored approach of making modest 
adjustments to the common law, generally in the direction of 
greater landowner liability.105  It was the variegated collection of 
approaches that faced the reporters of the Third Restatement 
(Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009) as they set out to “restate” the law of 
premises liability. 
III. THE ALI LABORATORY CREATES THE “FLAGRANT TRESPASSER” 
The reporters were faced with an interesting situation when 
considering the law of premises liability.  By their count, the states 
were basically split down the middle, with about half retaining the 
three-tiered/status approach; the rest either collapsed invitees and 
licensees into a single category and imposed the garden-variety 
duty of reasonable care (but continued to recognize a 
circumscribed duty to trespassers), or followed California and 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from 
the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 512 n.163 (1976) (citations omitted).  
 104. Id. at 513–14. 
 105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 51 cmt. a reporters’ note & table (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009); see also 
Ann Fievet, Comment, Breaking the Law and Getting Paid for It: How the Third 
Restatement of Torts Synthesizes Two Distinct Standards of Care Owed to Trespassers, 44 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239 (2009) (summarizing the common law). 
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adopted a unitary approach.106 
As an initial matter, the ALI decided to meld the categories of 
invitees and licensees, so that both classes of entrants on land were 
owed a duty of reasonable care.107  This move was eminently 
sensible—after all, both groups are on the premises with the 
owner’s permission and thus impose no “taking” or infringement 
on the right of quiet use and enjoyment nor upon the related right 
to exclude unwanted visitors from the premises.108  It is also the case 
that there is often no greater burden imposed on the property 
owner for social, as opposed to business, guests.  And, as 
mentioned previously, this position is consistent with the law in 
about half of the states since the Second Restatement.109 
The new provisions also went  a step further, tacking in the 
direction of a minority of states led by California in Rowland that 
extend the duty of reasonable care even to trespassers.110  In so 
doing, the ALI adopted a unitary standard, but added an important 
and quite new concept, reflecting the broad array of motives that 
may explain a trespasser’s presence on the premises—the duty of 
reasonable care did not extend to “flagrant trespassers.”  Such 
miscreants were owed only the traditional minimal duty of care 
owed to persons on the land without permission, i.e., the duty to 
merely refrain from inflicting “willful and wanton injury.”111  The 
motivation of the reporters was clear: the “trespasser” category 
contains actors who enter the premises with a broad range of 
motivations and who engaged in a variety of conduct—some as 
 
 106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 51 cmt. a reporters’ note & table  (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009). 
 107. See id. at cmt. a. 
 108. See id. at cmt. c (listing justifications for moving toward a unitary 
standard). 
 109. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 cmts. b, c (1965).   
 110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 51 cmt. a reporters’ note & table (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009) (listing 
states that extend a full duty of reasonable care to trespassers: Alaska, California, 
Colorado, Hawaii, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York).  
 111. Id. § 52(a).  Additionally, section 51, comment j describes the 
circumstances in which even states adopting a unitary standard are reluctant to 
extend the duty of reasonable care to all trespassers, i.e., to trespassers who enter 
the property to commit a crime or act in some other way repugnant to the 
possessor’s right of exclusive control.  Section 52, comment a, defined the 
category undeserving of a duty of reasonable care as when the trespass is 
“egregious or atrocious,” or “sufficiently offensive to the property rights of the 
land possessor it is unfair to subject the possessor to liability for mere negligence.”  
An earlier draft used the terminology “culpable” trespassers.  See infra note 115 
and accompanying text. 
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benign as the child who cuts across another’s yard on the way to 
school, some as malign as a burglar imbued with felonious intent.  
The response of the Second Restatement to this array of 
circumstances was to carve out a few context-specific exceptions 
(the child trespasser doctrine being the best-known).112  The focus 
in the Third Restatement (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009) became 
whether the infringement of the owner’s property was “highly 
culpable or entitlement destructive.”113  
The reporters tried to capture the distinction by identifying in 
the comments to section 52 those trespassers whose presence on 
the property was “egregious or atrocious” (or elsewhere 
“particularly egregious”) and thus “so antithetical to the rights of 
the land possessor to exclusive use and possession” that it is 
“unfair” to impose anything more than the most minimal duty of 
care.114  The reporters then made a most unusual move, eschewing 
the step that most lawyers follow instinctively when a term of art is 
employed, that is, providing a definition.  Instead, the reporters 
“[left] each jurisdiction employing the concept to determine the 
point along the spectrum of trespassory conduct at which a 
trespasser is a ‘flagrant’ rather than an ordinary trespasser.”115  
In an effort to provide at least some guidance, the reporters 
identified two examples that “are sufficiently extreme as to be 
applicable regardless of where a jurisdiction chooses to draw the 
[flagrant/ordinary] line.”116  The first case involves a person 
walking in a city park after the posted hours it was open to the 
public, an act that was trespassory but not highly inconsistent with 
the rights of the city, while the second—the flagrant trespasser—
involves a burglar who is injured while trying to flee the 
 
 112. See supra note 111. 
 113. Ellen M. Bublick, A Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Intentional Harm 
to Persons—Thoughts, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1335, 1346 (2009). 
 114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
52 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009) (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009); see also id. at 
cmt. b (noting that the presence of flagrant trespassers is “so inconsistent with and 
offensive to the rights of the land possessor”). 
 115. Id. at cmt. a.  It is interesting to note that the reporters say “no single 
word can capture the concept,” but then provide what amounts to a single 
appellation: “flagrant.”  Id.; see also James A. Henderson, Jr., The Status of Trespassers 
on Land, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1071, 1077, n.35 (2009) (criticizing the use of the 
term “flagrant” and noting that a previous draft used, and actually defined, the 
term “culpable”).   
 116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
52 cmt. a reporters’ note (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009). 
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defendant’s premises.117  Other illustrations are offered to show 
“factors that might be relevant to a determination whether a 
trespass was flagrant,” including a pair of examples in which the 
injured person was engaged in highly culpable behavior but in one 
instance did not also implicate the right of the possessor “to use 
that property as the possessor sees fit,”118 and another pair which 
are distinguished by repeated warnings and damage to property.119 
The reporters then set out to justify why they took the highly 
unusual step of recognizing a new legal concept but not defining it.  
First, different jurisdictions might set the balance between safety 
concerns and the rights of property owners differently, giving more 
(or less) weight to the balance between communitarian and 
libertarian values.120  Second, some jurisdictions might prefer 
“bright-line rules” to a more flexible standard that allows for case-
by-case development.121  Third, and closely related to the second 
point, the reporters pay homage to the “common law process 
[that] depends on accumulated learning from individual cases” to 
help gradually define a concept that is “new to the Restatement.”122 
The Reporters’ Note identifies support for their choice, 
though none of it terribly convincing: extrapolation from a handful 
of criminal statutes, drawing negative inferences from a group of 
about ten state court decisions, and dicta from a single decision of 
 
 117. Id. at cmt. a, illus. 1, 2. 
 118. Id. at cmt. a.  The reporters distinguish an injury occurring on property in 
conjunction with a crime on the property (flagrant trespass) and an injury that 
occurs after a crime was committed off the premises but where the injury occurs 
on the premises (ordinary trespass).  Id. at cmt. a, illus. 3, 4. 
 119. See id. at cmt. a, illus. 5, 6.  In illustration five, the landowner “erected 
large signs warning trespassers to keep off and employed a private security firm to 
patrol the area.”  Id. at cmt. a, illus. 5.  In illustration 6, the trespassers repeatedly 
returned to the landowner’s property to destroy it despite verbal warnings.  Id. at 
cmt. a, illus. 6. 
 120. See id. at cmt. a (“[D]ifferent jurisdictions . . . will have different values 
about the relative importance of protecting the safety of entrants on land and 
protecting the rights of land possessors . . . .”). 
 121. Id.  On the other hand, “[o]thers may prefer to adopt more general 
standards that allow the factfinder to take into account all of the facts and 
circumstances of the case.”  Id. 
 122. Id.  This, as will be seen, is an understatement: the concept is new not just 
to the Third Restatement but to the law more broadly.  See, e.g., Bublick, supra note 
113, at 1346 (“Introducing the new category ‘flagrant trespasser’ into the law was a 
subject of concern precisely because the category created a division where none 
had previously been, requiring new common-law development of the concept by 
judges.”).  
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the Alabama Supreme Court.123  
The first authority cited is the legislative push-back from the 
unitary standard of care recognized in Rowland v. Christian in the 
form of a California statute that stripped a person injured on the 
land from a claim based upon mere negligence if they were in the 
process of committing one of a list of twenty-five felonies, and 
similar legislation in five other states and British Columbia.124 
Next, the reporters point to the post-Rowland decisions that 
refused to adopt a unitary standard that encompassed trespassers 
because “a criminal intruder who is injured should not be able to 
sue the negligent land possessor.”125  They summarized these cases, 
observing that “no source has been found expressing any dissent to 
the proposition that land possessors should not be liable for 
negligently injuring a criminal trespasser.”126 
Their most direct case authority is a decision of the Alabama 
Supreme Court, which distinguishes “‘mere’ trespassers” from 
trespassers who are on the premises with the intent to commit a 
crime.127  According to the reporters, Ryals v. U.S. Steel Corp.128 
“employs different duties for each class of trespasser.”129  A closer 
look at the opinion, however, weakens the precedential value, as 
the case turned on whether the plaintiff adduced sufficient 
evidence of wanton misconduct, with the recognition of two classes 
of trespassers appearing in dicta.130 
These and the other cited sources do support the view that all 
trespassers should not be treated the same,131 as the common law 
 
 123. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 52 cmt. a reporters’ note (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009). 
 124. Id. The five additional states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, 
and Washington. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  
 128. 562 So. 2d 192 (Ala. 1990). 
 129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
52 cmt. a reporters’ note (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009).  
 130. Ryals, 562 So. 2d at 193–95 (issue presented was whether plaintiff 
adduced sufficient of wrongdoing to withstand summary judgment).  
 131. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 52 cmt. a reporters’ note (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009); see also, e.g., Ryals, 
562 So.2d at 193 (noting that “trespassers who enter upon the land of another 
with the manifest intent to commit a criminal act” are trespassers “to whom the 
landowner owes only the duty not to intentionally injure them” while “mere 
trespassers” are trespassers “to whom the landowner owes the duty not to wantonly 
injure them”). 
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has done for years by recognizing exceptions for children, known 
trespassers, and so forth,132 and given the intuition (or in their 
language “widespread sentiment”) that someone who enters 
another’s land without permission intending to commit a serious 
wrong is undeserving of a duty of reasonable care from the putative 
victim.133  And the statutory provisions referred to, along with the 
scattered language in the cited opinions, do support a minority 
view that criminals are undeserving of a duty of due care.134  What is 
lacking is any support for creating an entirely new category: the 
“flagrant trespasser.”  This, the reporters recognize, albeit 
delicately: “The synthesis of land-possessor duties provided in this 
Chapter and Section employs different terminology than that used 




 132. E.g., Robert S. Driscoll, Note, The Law of Premises Liability in America: Its 
Past, Present, and Some Considerations for its Future, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 881, 885 
(2006) (discussing common-law liability for trespassers and noting that exceptions 
exist where “the landowner knows or has reason to know that members of the 
public constantly trespass, knows or has reason to know of a specific trespasser on 
the land, or with trespassers who are children.”).  
 133. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB, FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 52 cmt. a reporters’ note (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009); see also, e.g., 
Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 165, 199 N.W.2d 639, 642 (1972) (“Burglars are 
trespassers; vandals are trespassers.  We have criminal statutes governing 
trespassers.  Sweeping away all distinction between trespassers and social guests 
and business invitees is a drastic step to take because there may be, and often is, 
good reason to distinguish between a trespasser and a social guest.” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
 134. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 52 cmt. a reporters’ note (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009) (noting that “[a] 
handful of states have statutes that limit the ability of plaintiffs to recover for 
injuries suffered in the course of committing (or fleeing the commission of) 
certain crimes.”); see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-119 (2005) (“No person . . 
. shall have a right to recover damages sustained during the commission of or 
during immediate flight from an act that is defined by any law of this state or the 
United States to be a felony, if the conditions stipulated in this section apply.”); 
Ryals, 562 So. 2d at 193 (noting that “trespassers who enter upon the land of 
another with the manifest intent to commit a criminal act” are trespassers “to 
whom the landowner owes only the duty not to intentionally injure them”).  
 135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 52 cmt. a reporters’ note (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009).  The new rules include 
an exception that protects even some “flagrant trespassers” because they are 
“unforeseeable or more difficult to protect.”  Id. at § 52(b). 
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IV. THE THIRD RESTATEMENT AND THE ROAD NEVER BEFORE TAKEN 
As was the case when the ALI adopted the principle of strict 
liability in tort for product-related injuries, the ALI set sail in 
uncharted waters when it recognized a new premises liability 
category, the “flagrant trespasser.”  As the reporters admit, “[i]n all 
candor, the place where we have carved at the joint of this conflict 
between tort and property concerns does not reflect anything that 
might be described as a majority or even plurality rule.” 136  There 
are a number of criticisms that can be leveled at the ALI for 
adopting this approach.  First, the rules covering injuries to such 
miscreants are internally inconsistent.  Second, the term used to 
describe the category of undeserving plaintiffs is inartful.  Third, it 
is unwise to announce but refuse to define it.  Fourth, the creation 
of a new legal concept represents an illegitimate exercise of power.  
A. The Inconsistency Critique  
Section 52 is flawed because it reflects inconsistent rationales: 
nodding toward normative concerns, it rejects an obligation of due 
care for really bad (“flagrant”) trespassers, while at the same time 
nodding toward instrumental/efficiency concerns by recognizing 
exceptions that impose due care when a flagrant trespasser is 
helpless and unable to protect himself—recognizing that, in such a 
setting, the landowner is in the best position to ameliorate 
danger.137   
This critique, propounded by James Henderson,138 is weak.  It 
is unsurprising that a restatement provision fails the test of 
intellectual consistency: the common law of torts reflects a blend of 
policies, primarily corrective justice and instrumentalism and 
wealth-maximization, and just as we should expect the output from 
the legislative process to reflect compromise and trade-off, we 
should be tolerant of such “impure” doctrines in the common 
law.139  As Ellen Bublick observed:  
 
 136. Id. at Reporters’ Memorandum. 
 137. Henderson, supra note 115, at 1076–77.  
 138. Id.  
 139. Jane Stapleton, Controlling the Future of the Common Law by Restatement, in 
EXPLORING TORT LAW 262, 266–67 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005).  Another 
critique of the new premises liability provisions focuses on the “packaging,” that is 
that premises principles should not have been covered in a separate chapter at all, 
but rather were better located in the general discussion of duty in section 7.  See 
Stephen D. Sugarman, Land-Possessor Liability in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Too 
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Of course, a Restatement cannot create a grand scheme 
that unites all disparate tort doctrines into a single 
uniform framework.  Nor can the drafting process 
unearth an essential taxonomy of the subject.  Yet when 
designing a system of liability, a Restatement need not be 
sanguine about adopting a patchwork of liability rules that 
cannot be reconciled on any principled basis.140 
B. The Terminology Critique 
The narrowest concern raised by how the Third Restatement 
handles injuries to trespassers is the choice of the word “flagrant” 
to describe the category of injured entrants who are undeserving of 
a duty of due care.  The reporters state that the term “flagrant” is 
used “in the sense of egregious or atrocious rather than its 
alternative meaning of conspicuous.”141  This was a change from 
earlier drafts, which used the term “culpable.”142 
 Professor Henderson takes issue with the terminology, 
preferring either the initial term used (“culpable”), or replacing it 
with a word such as “undeserving,” or “reprehensible”.143  To 
Henderson, the ALI’s final formulation fails to capture the lack of 
moral standing of a particular trespasser (rather than merely the 
wrongfulness associated by an “entry without permission, as 
such”).144 
The reporters acknowledge the problem by trying to take one 
possible meaning of flagrant off of the table: the sense that it could 
mean “conspicuous” (for example, a noisy entrance intended to 
call attention to the intrusion on to defendant’s property).145  And 
they admit that “no single word can capture the concept,” although 
 
Much and Too Little, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1079 (2009). 
 140. Bublick, supra note 113, at 1335–36 (2009); see also GILMORE, supra note 5, 
at 108–09 (“[T]he components of the formalistic approach have included the 
search for the theoretical formulas assumed to be of universal validity and the 
insistence that all particular instances should be analyzed and dealt with in the 
light of the overall theoretical structure. . . . [W]e will do well to be on our guard 
against all-purpose theoretical solutions to our problems.”). 
 141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, § 
52 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009). 
 142. Id. § 52(a). 
 143. Henderson, supra note 115, at 1077.  Other meanings that are implicitly 
excluded include “blatant,” “glaring,” and “obvious.”  MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2011). 
 144. Henderson, supra note 115, at 1077. 
 145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, § 
52 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 6 2009). 
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that, of course, is not responsive to whether “flagrant” comes 
closest to capturing both the factual settings and the policies 
implicated.146  The reporters also try to make clear the focus is not 
solely upon the intent of the entrant, as when a bank robber’s 
escape leads to a private yard where an injury occurs.147  In such a 
circumstance the felon would not, despite being a bad person, be 
considered a “flagrant” trespasser because the entrance did not 
strip the owner of her “rights to personal security,” as compared to 
a thief injured on the premises in the process of an effort to 
burglarize the premises.148   
Such outcomes are, admittedly, “counter to some intuitions” 
but reflect the singular focus on the extent to which the wrong is 
“antithetical to the rights of the land possessor to exclusive 
possession and use of the land.”149  While Professor Henderson’s 
critique has merit, his preferred locutions add little that is not 
available to a person trying to capture the gist of the section from a 
close reading of the black-letter law and comments. 
C. The Lawmaking Critique 
The reporters are candid.  They recognize that they have 
created a legal category where one never existed before: “The 
synthesis of land-possessor duties provided in this Chapter and 
Section employs different terminology than that used in the 
Second Restatement or in the reforms to that law that have 
emerged since.”150  The ALI has in the past only occasionally 
undertaken to identify an important new principle, justified not by 
a synthesis of court decisions but rather on a belief that existing law 
was flawed, with the best example in the torts context the 
recognition of “strict liability in tort” in section 402A of the Second 
Restatement.151 
Reluctance to remake the law makes sense on a number of 
grounds.  First, it is consistent with the common law method, which 
relies upon many judges deciding many cases involving many 
variations in the facts over time.  The intrinsic conservatism of the 
common law approach was reflected in the observation of Arthur 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See supra notes 40–58 and accompanying text. 
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Corbin, who urged the ALI of the 1930s to proceed cautiously in its 
law reform efforts: “[T]he best way to turn mores into law is to do it 
piecemeal by the ‘molecular motion’ of the courts.”152  This general 
preference for incrementalism over bold strokes was well described 
by Cass Sunstein: 
“Anglo-American courts often take small rather than large 
steps, bracketing the hardest and most divisive issues. 
. . . . 
. . . It is alert to the existence of reasonable disagreement 
in a heterogeneous society.  It knows that there is much 
that it does not know; it is intensely aware of its own 
limitations. . . . It avoids clear rules and final resolutions.  
Alert to the problem of unanticipated consequences, it 
sees itself as part of a system of democratic deliberation; it 
attempts to promote the democratic ideals of 
participation, deliberation, and responsiveness.  It allows 
continued space for democratic reflection . . . .”153 
Guido Calabresi described how the “slow, unsystematic, and 
organic quality of common law” meant that “no single judge could 
ultimately change the law, and a series of judges could only do so 
over time and in response to changed events or to changed 
attitudes in the people.”154 
One can extract from such classic discussions of the common 
law method the following characteristics: 
 Modesty.  Judges working in the common law system must be 
aware of the inability of humans to solve complex problems.  
They should proceed with humility and a recognition of the risk 
of causing unintended consequences through the exercise of 
judicial power.  Even the wisest judge should display a Burkean 
reluctance to attack—let alone try to solve—grand problems.155  
As Benjamin Cardozo observed, “The common law does not 
work from pre-established truths of universal and inflexible 
 
 152. Arthur L. Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American Law 
Institute, 15 IOWA L. REV. 19, 28 (1930). 
 153. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT ix–x (1999). 
 154. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUES 4, 5 (1982). 
 155. David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 845, 857–60 (2007) (“It is unwise to try to resolve a problem without 
deferring to some degree to the collected wisdom reflected in what others have 
done when faced with a similar problem in the past.”); see also GRANT GILMORE, 
THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 99–100 (1977) (“Man’s fate will forever elude the 
attempts of his intellect to understand it.”). 
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validity to conclusions derived from them deductively.  Its 
method is inductive . . . .”156 
 A preference for precedent.  Common law judges do not 
generally work on a blank canvas, and this is not just due to a 
generalized preference for relying upon judicial precedents.  
Rather, it reflects a healthy respect for a “rough empiricism” and 
an inclination toward concrete solutions to specific problems, 
rather than the tackling of what are invariably complex issues via 
abstract notions of how the world should be.157  The result is 
doctrine “forged from . . . the hammer and anvil of litigation” 
and a system built by the “gradual accretion of special 
instances,”158 i.e., a system characterized by “[e]volution, not 
revolution [and] slow and unconscious adaptation . . . .”159 
 Dialogue.  Common law judges can be seen as pursuing a 
version of the scientific method.  They welcome the opportunity 
to test possible outcomes and reasoning by considering the 
decisions of other judges facing similar problems.160  In turn, the 
common law judge’s decision becomes a data point for the next 
judge who faces an identical, or even related, fact situation, who 
then asks whether the earlier decision appears to have been a 
wise resolution.  In this sense, the common law judge launches a 
“trial balloon,” whose virtue is then measured by the judges that 
later come to face a similar question.161  As a venerable 
 
 156. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 22–23 
(1921). 
 157. Strauss, supra note 155, at 858; see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE 
GROWTH OF THE LAW 55 (1924) (“[The common law] process of trial and error 
determines [judgments’] right to reproduce their kind.”); O. W. HOLMES, THE 
COMMON LAW xix (Mark D. Howe ed., Harv. Univ. Press 1963) (1881) (“[T]he 
common law is . . . a lesson in the tentative and experimental character of 
judgment.”). 
 158. Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6, 
7 (1937).  For a considerably less sanguine view of the value of precedent, see 
FRANK ZAPPA WITH PETER OCCHIOGROSSO, THE REAL FRANK ZAPPA BOOK 327–28 
(1989) (“Case law is what happens when a stupid judicial decision from one place 
gets cited as a ‘legal precedent,’ forming the basis for another stupid judicial 
decision somewhere else—like a computer virus.”) (emphasis in original). 
 159. Bruce Ackerman, The Common Law Constitution of John Marshall Harlan, 36 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 5, 6 (1991) (noting also the cultural impact of intellectual 
Darwinism). 
 160. MUNROE SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1908). 
 161. See Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental 
Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 
1837 n.1043 (2001) (citing and quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 176 (1962)); see 
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proponent of the common law method put it, common law rules 
are laid “down provisionally only.”162 
It is interesting to consider how the Third Restatement fares 
on these counts.  The most obvious question is the wisdom of 
announcing a legal category where none existed before.  
Introducing the “flagrant trespasser” will require judges to 
consider, and construct, a new legal principle.163  But “[t]he need 
for the division stemmed from issues of principle or policy—the 
need for a no-duty rule in some trespasser cases but not others—
not from a need to update a Restatement project to match new 
doctrines that had been developed by common-law courts.”164 
However, the reporters did pursue a “rough empiricism” (what 
they call a “synthesis”),165 albeit not by counting cases (the typical 
approach) but instead by teasing out of the judicial decisions that 
have rejected a unitary regime a perceived need to protect 
premises owners from entrants with a purpose fundamentally at 
odds with the rights of the owner.166  In addition, and consistent 
with past practice, the reporters could point to the legislative 
reactions post-Rowland that have rejected extending a duty of due 
care to this sort of trespasser.167 
And how about dialogue?  In a most unusual move, the 
reporters eschewed defining the “flagrant trespasser” category, 
while providing six examples of where the line might be drawn 
between flagrant and non-flagrant trespassers.  This is a highly 
unusual maneuver, at least in the Third Restatement.  In only one 
other place in the project did the reporters reflect uncertainty 
regarding the adopted position.  In the discussion of “factual 
cause” (section 26), the reporters added a comment “n” that 
 
also David R. Barnhizer, Prophets, Priests, and Power Blockers: Three Fundamental Roles 
of Judges and Legal Scholars in America, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 127, 141–42 (1988) 
(arguing that the “real role of the Common Law judge” involves the ability to 
“release . . . hypothetical ‘trial balloons’”). 
 162. JAMES C. CARTER, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAW 25 
(1884) microformed on Nineteenth-Century Legal Treatises No. 1183 (Research 
Publications). 
 163. Bublick, supra note 113, at 1346. 
 164. Id. 
 165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
52 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009). 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Greenwald, supra note 39, at 301 (“The second series of Restatements . 
. . [has] come increasingly to draw upon statutes as sources of future common-law 
developments.”). 
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discusses “lost opportunity or lost chance as harm.”  After 
describing the circumstances in which the doctrine has been 
recognized (characterized as “halting”) the reporters declined to 
endorse the concept.168 
  Interestingly, the Second Restatement made far greater use 
of a similar deferential device, the “caveat.”  Caveats were 
appropriate because “the function of the reporter was to state the 
law as it is rather than to speculate as to what the law should be in 
cases where there is substantially no authority.”169 
There were numerous caveats in previous restatements of torts.  
For example, in the discussion of strict liability for “ultrahazardous 
activities,” section 520 added: “Caveat: The Institute expresses no 
opinion as to whether the construction and use of a large tank or 
artificial reservoir in which a large body of water or other fluid is 
collected is or is not an ultrahazardous activity.”170  More broadly, 
the first section of the Second Restatement announced that 
subsequent sections will contain many caveats reflecting the 
generative nature of tort law.171 
The failure of the Third Restatement to define “flagrant 
trespasser” can then be seen as consistent with examples from past 
restatements as well as the “dialogic” ideal of the common law.  The 
tactic allows for, indeed invites, the full and rounded consideration 
 
 168. The reporters identified two reasons for this position: the fact that the 
doctrine “reconceptualizes the harm” means that the concept is not simply a 
matter of factual causation, and because courts have so far confined the concept 
to medical malpractice contexts, it was part of “a specialized area of negligence 
liability outside the scope of this Restatement.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. n (2005).  
 169. See Patrick J. Kelley, The First Restatement of Torts: Reform by Descriptive 
Theory, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 93, 105 (2007) (quoting Francis H. Bohlen, reporter for 
the Restatement (First) of Torts (1934)). 
 170. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. c (1938).  This limitation seems 
surprising given that the seminal case applying strict liability for harmful uses of 
land, Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] UKHL 1, (1868) LR 3 HL 330, has been discussed 
in many American cases and was well known and the subject of significant 
commentary, including an extended discussion in the reporter’s treatise. See 
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 77 (3d ed. 1964). 
 171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e (1965) (“Because of the 
probability that the tendency to give legal protection to interests now unprotected 
and to increase the protection given to those now imperfectly protected will 
continue, the Restatement of this Subject contains numerous ‘Caveats.’ These call 
attention to the fact that the Institute takes no position as to whether the 
protection given to a particular interest by the rule stated in the Section to which 
the Caveat applies should or should not be extended to other analogous situations 
which have not been the subject of judicial consideration.”). 
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of the issues raised (like whether a state would prefer a bright-line 
rule that applies to all felons injured on the premises), while 
providing examples that can be used to guide, if not direct, the 
analysis by courts.  
The “flagrant trespasser” is not a “bright-line concept but one 
that is left to develop in future cases.  But it does have the 
advantage of a reasoned, progressive approach that avoids the 
confusing array of classes of trespassers that are sprinkled 
throughout decisions,”172 while at the same time recognizing the 
appealing notion that not all trespassers are alike.  And, the very 
restatement process itself, with all of its layers of review, involving 
hundreds of specialists in the field, provides some assurance that 
the position adopted will not be wildly off the mark.173 
In summary, the Third Restatement reporters can cleave 
themselves to the words of one of the greatest twentieth-century 
thinkers (and one-time ALI director) Herbert Wechsler: “The 
crucial point has always seemed to me to be that a decision when it 
breaks new ground . . . initiates a dialogue by its supporting 
reasons, reasons whose persuasiveness to others will largely be the 
measure of its ultimate success.”174 
D. The Legitimacy Critique  
By any measure, the ALI and its restatements play an 
important role in debates about legal rules, especially in torts.  
Regularly cited by courts, and undoubtedly relied upon by 
 
 172. Michael D. Green & Larry S. Stewart, The New Restatement’s Top 10 Torts 
Tools, TRIAL, Apr. 2010, at 47. 
 173. See Doug Rendelman, Restating Restitution: The Restatement and Its Critics, 65 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 933, 943 (2008) (“The restatement process does not 
specifically follow a common law court’s adversary technique, with the reporter 
acting as judge, receiving adversaries’ briefs, and drafting an opinion for a 
collegial court. But the ALI’s formal process resembles the best features of a 
common law decision-making process: ‘[t]he combination of explicitly normative 
reasoning with a reliance on the lessons of the past, along with a recognition that 
both are indispensable.’ . . . Related areas are examined.  Majority and minority 
rules are consulted. The reporter’s research, ideas, and articulation are tested 
against others’. The reporter’s drafts are exposed to the curiosity and candor of 
the members’ consultive group, the advisers, the council, and the members. Each 
phase is a potential intellectual crucible, although the testing may occur off the 
public stage. Although its membership could be more diverse, the ALI internal 
process is rigorous and intellectually heterogeneous within the intellectual 
community of doctrinal legal analysis.”).  
 174.  Herbert Wechsler, Address at the Annual Dinner of the American Law Institute 
(May 17, 1984), 61 A.L.I. PROC. 408, 411 (1985) (on file with author). 
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practitioners even more often, restatements help shape the law in 
an increasingly broad array of fields.175  This great influence is in 
large measure due to the level of talent arrayed for projects, 
especially the reporters and, to a lesser extent, the advisers, who 
have deep and broad involvement in the subject areas covered.  
These drafters, though as a group highly regarded in their 
particular areas of expertise, are then necessarily unrepresentative 
of the legal profession, let alone the citizenry generally.176 
 The selection process for key roles within the ALI is even less 
democratic: the council is selected from the membership (typically 
about 3,000 academic and practicing lawyers and judges, but with 
little actual competition for leadership positions, as is the case with 
the governance of many non-profits).177  The council has the sole 
power to appoint the director.178  The director, then, has broad 
authority to both identify the topics appropriate for “restating” as 
well as to appoint the reporters and advisers, although the practice 
is for the director to consult members of the council before making 
these important decisions.179  And while reporters typically bring 
knowledge and expertise to deliberations, their degree of influence 
is uneven.  As one reporter wrote, “The text of a restatement . . . is 
largely the product of the reporter.  The reporter must answer, of 
course, to a group of advisers, but their oversight is incomplete” 
due to “[l]imitations of time and expertise.”180 
  Once the advisers sign off, the reporters seek approval from 
the council (a group of approximately fifty-five), but the level of 
understanding and preparation in this group may not be the match 
for a strong-willed reporter.181  The final step is approval by the 
entire membership, but in practice many issues are resolved by a 
relatively small group who prepare for the annual meeting (by 
reading the voluminous materials beforehand) and who are willing, 
 
 175. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.  The ALI has also been 
influential in non-restatement projects, such as the Model Penal Code. AMERICAN 
LAW INSTITUTE, PAST AND PRESENT ALI PROJECTS 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.ali.org/doc/past_present_ALIprojects.pdf.  
 176. See Adams, supra note 24, at 239; Posner, supra note 62, at 323. 
 177. AM. LAW INST., RULES OF THE COUNCIL, 1–4 (2007), available at 
http://www.ali.org/doc/rules_council.pdf.  
 178. Id. at 8.  
 179. E-mail from Lance Liebman, ALI Director, to author (Oct. 26, 2010) (on 
file with author). 
 180. Charles W. Wolfram, Bismarck’s Sausages and the ALI’s Restatements, 26 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 830 (1998).  
 181. Id. at 831–32. 
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despite their busy schedules, to sit through hours of debate.182  
Indeed, on occasion, a provision is considered and passed by fewer 
than one hundred members.183  
 Such a closed loop of a system would be unacceptable if the 
end result of ALI projects were binding on courts, which, of course, 
they are not.  Nevertheless, this is an area of concern because of 
this combination of high influence and low representation.184  This 
critique is especially persuasive in the context of the exercise of 
judicial power, because federal judges, and many state judges, 
constitute the least democratic branch of government, largely 
immune from the discipline provided by the need to regularly 
stand for general election (often termed “the countermajoritan 
difficulty”).185  
 And, just as no ALI pronouncement binds any judge (let 
alone legislator), the legislature and executive branches have the 
power (within constitutional limits) to overrule a court’s decision 
to adopt a restatement rule.  However, “Restatements can have the 
same dire consequence [as a statute]—relied upon by a tribunal for 
a proposition that burdens a litigant in a proceeding no matter 
how strenuous the litigant’s argument that the restatement 
provision in question has it wrong.”186   
 Although ALI positions are not the result of anything close 
to a democratic process,187 the institute’s handiwork is intended to, 
and often does, impact society.  And having a meritocratic rather 
than democratic process yields not only decision makers who are 
knowledgeable, but also the virtue of members less likely to be 
swayed by the passions of the street.  Ultimately, the level of 
influence accorded a restatement rule is determined in the rough 
and tumble of litigation in coming years.  In this sense, the ALI’s 
work, though antidemocratic in origin, will be tested and will stand 
or fall in the marketplace of ideas. 
 
 182. Id. at 832. 
 183. Id.  
 184. See id.; see Elson, supra note 68.  
 185. See JAMES W. CAESAR, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, ORIGINS, INSTITUTIONS, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 410 (2002). 
 186. Wolfram, supra note 180, at 817.  Professor Wolfram notes the “strange 
exceptions . . . [involving] the United States Northern Mariana and Virgin Islands 
where local statutes make a Restatement position binding . . . in the absence of 
contrary local authority.”  Id. at 819 n.8. 
 187. Id. at 829 (“[T]he ALI process of generating a Restatement is hardly artful 
or even inartfully democratic.”). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Third Restatement made welcome changes to premises 
liability law, especially the merging of invitee and licensee 
categories, a move that reflects modern, rather than feudal 
concepts about the relative value of safety versus the prerogatives of 
landowners.  The proposals will also hopefully bring order where 
there is now a morass of rules and exceptions and exceptions to 
exceptions, not just differing among jurisdictions, but even within a 
single jurisdiction.  There is also much positive about heightened 
concern with safety in the many contexts when trespassers are 
injured on the premises.  And, as a measure of progress, the 
restatement treatment of trespassers has been reduced from seven 
to two sections, a positive step in the direction of a core ALI goal of 
simplifying the law.   
What is not so clear is whether the new category of flagrant 
trespasser is the right approach.  As a creature of normative policy, 
it reflects the common sense notion that wrongdoers are generally 
disfavored in the law: the equitable doctrine of “unclean hands” or 
the common law rule that a plaintiff’s gross negligence precludes 
recovery from a defendant whose conduct was merely negligent are 
but two examples.  It also has support in scattered positive law, like 
the state statutes that preclude liability when a trespasser is injured 
while committing a felony.188  The rub is the absence of judicial 
decisions, with the ALI proceeding in largely uncharted territory, 
not restating the law but rather making it up.  This is inconsistent 
with the most recently articulated ALI position: “[The restatement 
aims] at clear formulations of common law and its statutory 
elements or variations and reflect the law as it presently stands or 
might plausibly be stated by a court.  Restatement black-letter 
formulations assume the stance of describing the law as it is.”189 
The handling of flagrant trespassers thus lays bare the core 
tension that exists in the very DNA of the elite and undemocratic 
ALI: whether it should be a force for bold law reform or a merely a 
tidier of messy common law doctrine, whether it should stake out 
“what law should be” rather than merely stating “what the law is.”190  
 
 188. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 52 reporters’ note (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009). 
 189. Projects, Overview, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, http://ali.org/index.cfm
?fuseaction=projects.main (last visited Mar. 17, 2011). 
 190. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 743–44 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); see also Roberta Cooper 
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The decision to create the flagrant trespasser category was made 
without grounding in the product of many judges working on a 
problem on a case-by-case basis, the core strength of the common 
law process.  The bold move is ameliorated somewhat by the 
“punt,” reflected in the comments, in which the ALI expressly 
eschews providing a core definition for the “flagrant trespasser” 
concept, expressly leaving that task to judges in future cases. 




Ramo, The President’s Letter: On Compromise and Civility: American and American Law 
Institute Values, 32 A.L.I. REP. 3 (2010) (“Reaching an ALI-authorized position that 
achieves a fair view of the current state of law or an equally fair position of what 
the law should be requires good representation from all points of view, a respect 
for the majority view in the law across the country, and significant agreement on 
the part of advisers, Members Consultative Groups, the Council, and ultimately 
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